The International and Domestic Sources of Governments' Civil Society Restrictions, 1994-2014

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Abstract

Undermining civil society is a potent strategy for autocratizing regimes. Scholars argue that civil society restrictions rob citizens of their fundamental human rights and fuel a global trend of democratic backsliding. We assess the degree to which international policy diffusion and domestic forces affect a government's decision whether—and how much—to restrict civil society, including decisions to relax restrictions. We use a global dataset of *de facto* civil society policies between 1994 and 2014, which we analyze using directed-dyadic data in a generalized linear mixed-model. We find that international influences work alongside domestic factors, though not necessarily in the same direction. Our results highlight three facts about these restrictions overlooked by scholars: that governments adjust restrictions incrementally, that adjustments include both adding and removing restrictions, and that all regime types enforce restrictions. This speaks directly to the ongoing global phenomenon of state actors restricting the civic space.

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1 Introduction

Given civil society's role as an agent for democratization and a bulwark against non-democratic regimes (Linz and Stepan 1996; Mutunga 1999), undermining civil society is one strategy a government can use to autocracize its regime. Scholarship studying hostile policies towards civil society organizations (CSOs) focuses on domestic explanations and treats governments as independent actors, hell-bent on retaining power. Consequently, extant research leaves scholars with a one-dimensional account focused on domestic politics as the principal explanation for why non-democratic governments use these restrictions. Broadening our analysis to include all sovereign states in the international community—not just low-income or non-democratic societies—shows us that consolidated democracies also enforce illiberal policies (Swiney 2019; Bakke, Mitchell, and Smidt 2020).

While local factors are significant, we find that foreign governments influence local governments to alter their CSO restrictions, although no single diffusion mechanism or domestic factor sufficiently explains observed changes in restrictions. Recognizing that democracies enforce restrictions means that all regime types provide examples for what are effective and appropriate policy choices. The implication is that governments add and subtract restrictions as a response to both international influence and domestic circumstances.

We make four novel contributions while addressing this claim. First, we conceptualize the *de facto* CSO regulatory environment as bundles of restrictions that change incrementally over time. This adds nuance to prior work that conceptualizes restrictions as discrete and homogeneous changes to a country's regulatory environment. Second, we examine changes to a state's restrictions in terms of both direction and magnitude, acknowledging that if governments add restrictions, they can also remove them. This extends prior work in which

changes in restrictions are unidirectional and permanent. Third, we study governments' addition and subtraction of restrictions in all regime types and development levels, expanding on current research that generally excludes rich countries and democracies. Finally, we use a leader-laggard approach to study the inter-jurisdictional influence one state's restrictions has on others, moving beyond blunt 'neighborhood effects' to account for the varying levels of influence jurisdictions may have despite geographic distance.

Our analyses combine a directed-dyadic approach[1] with multilevel count models to show that the international community influences a government's choice to both increase and decrease restrictions and establish the relative effects of international processes compared to domestic factors. Inter-dependencies within the international community do not singularly determine a government's choice to alter restrictions, but instead operate alongside domestic factors, though not necessarily in the same direction. This implies that diffusion between governments can either amplify or dampen the number of restrictions a government would choose to deploy if it were truly independent.

We begin by highlighting a puzzle found in the US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor country reports—henceforth the "BMBA dataset"[2]—that measure the number of restrictions in use by each country between 1994 and 2014. Contrary

[1] Directed dyads consist of a pair of countries and a directed relationship between them, which represents some social phenomenon such as exports or foreign assistance.

[2] Kristin M. Bakke and Neil J. Mitchell produced this data with funding from the British Academy (SG152265). The data codes restrictions on civil society according to the US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. We use the data in the same way as Bakke, Mitchell, and Smidt (2020) and Smidt et al. (2020).

to existing studies, the BMBA data show that restrictions accrete over time, are not permanent, and are used by both non-democratic and democratic governments. We next review how policies diffuse across borders through distinct learning, emulation, and competitive adjustment mechanisms. We then discuss data and methods and present the results of our 'adds' and 'removes' statistical analyses. We conclude by reviewing a series of robustness checks, summarizing our main argument, and discussing broader implications.

2 Re-evaluating Research on CSO Restrictions

Researchers identify various tactics governments use to restrict CSOs. Wiktorowicz (2000, p.43) explains that governments use regulations and taxation rules to bind CSOs "in a web of bureaucratic practices and legal codes" that builds the administrative power needed to monitor and control CSOs (see also Bratton (1989)). In authoritarian contexts, such as China and North Korea, governments combine restrictions and arbitrary enforcement to create an environment of contingent symbiosis: CSOs avoid repression by providing public services that promote the government's social welfare goals as long as they avoid democratic claims-making (S. Snyder 2007; Spires 2011).

Many scholars studying CSO restrictions follow Christensen and Weinstein (2013) and focus on developing countries whose governments enact laws that restrict access to foreign funding (Reddy 2018; Bromley, Schofer, and Longhofer 2019). Limiting analyses to foreign funding restrictions risks conflating a lack of foreign funding restrictions with not having any restrictions. Currently, researchers recognize that governments enforce a broad array of restrictions to hinder civil society (Maru 2017; Musila 2019). While prior research has yielded important results, the conventional approach perpetuates three myths regarding

restrictions: first, that governments adjust restrictions through large-scale changes; second, that new restrictions represent permanent additions to the regulatory environment; and third, that such tactics are limited to non-democracies and developing countries.



Figure 1: Yearly Change in the Number of Restrictions Enforced

The BMBA data codes ten restriction types in use by each country between 1994 and 2014. When examined carefully, this data shows that large-scale adjustments are rare (See Figure 1). While the modal outcome is to maintain the status quo, the BMBA data shows that 88 percent of all changes to restrictions are between -2 and +2 restrictions per year.[3] What is more, the symmetric nature of the histogram shows that governments remove restrictions at nearly the same frequency and magnitude that they add them.[4] The

[3] Range [-7, +8], mean = 0.08, standard deviation = 0.99

[4] Non-democracies add restrictions 398 times and remove them 327 times. When

final myth is that only autocracies use restrictions. Empirically, democracies account for over 26 percent of all instances in which governments add restrictions that undermine civil society. While electoral democracies account for many of these, the data show that liberal democracies——e.g., Australia and France——also enforce restrictions. Democracies show the same patterns as non-democracies: no-change is most common, while removing and adding restrictions are roughly equal in frequency and magnitude.

Taken together, these observations require us to reconsider what it means for a government to "use CSO restrictions." Discussing restrictions as homogeneous, discrete, and permanent policies misconceptualizes them to the point of distortion. We demonstrate that it is more precise to discuss a government's use of restrictions as bundles of rules that change over time in both direction and magnitude. Doing so gives us greater analytical purchase to understand these political decisions.

Figure 2 shows the number of countries adding and removing restrictions. While the number of countries embracing these changes varies over time and by regime type, the magnitude of change consistently averages between one and two restrictions (dashed lines). The number of countries adding restrictions peaked in 2001,[5] and steadily decreased over

non-democracies change their restrictions-in-use, they on average add 1.54 restrictions and remove 1.49 restrictions. Maintaining the status quo does not mean non-democracies have exhausted all types of restrictions. When non-democracies maintain the status quo, they carry forward only one or two restrictions (median=1, mean=1.92).

[5] The number of countries enforcing restrictions peaked at 98 in 2000, and, by 2014, almost regresses to 1994 levels. Democracies represent between 11 (1994) and 32 (2000) of the states enforcing restrictions.



Figure 2: Adding and Removing Restrictions Adoption Curves

the following decade. Our argument is that the influence governments have on each other is an omitted variable that accounts for the dynamism in a state's use of restrictions. In the next section, we formulate theoretical predictions for how a foreign government can affect a government's decision on whether and how many restrictions to use.

3 Modeling International Policy Diffusion

When domestic circumstances lead governments into decisions on whether to hinder or help civil society—whether to add or remove CSO restrictions—those governments look to leaders in their external environments for examples of effective and acceptable policies. This diffusion process is the inter-jurisdictional influence that one government's policy decision has on changing the policies in the remaining pool of non-adopters (Gilardi, Shipan, and Wüest 2021, Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). Domestically, this manifests itself as city and provincial governments looking to their peers for the adoption of successful healthcare and anti-smoking programs (Volden 2006; Shipan and Volden 2006, 2008) or the emulation of energy policies and organizational structures (Baldwin, Carley, and Nicholson-Crotty 2019; Sommerer and Tallberg 2019). On the international scale, diffusion mechanisms have been shown to factor into entering a bilateral investment treaty to compete for economic resources (Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006).

We seek to build on the latter cases by suggesting that governments survey restrictions used by leaders to learn about the success rates of particular policies, whether emulating such policies would be seen as appropriate, and how said policies affect the abundance or scarcity of competitive resources. We define leaders as foreign governments enforcing a set of restrictions, and laggards as governments considering adopting at least one of those

restrictions.[6] When policy is a bundle of rules, diffusion occurs when governments adopt more of their peers' rules than they abandon (Shipan and Volden 2014, pp. 367-368).[7]

A laggard's neighbors, allies, and more powerful countries can each act as a leader that influences a laggard's choice to add or remove restrictions. Figure 3 summarizes the diffusion mechanisms we analyze: learning, emulation, and competitive adjustment. All mechanisms depend on laggards evaluating information from leaders that use a restriction the laggard currently does not. The strength of a leader's example is neither random nor equal among others.A leader's example is stronger and makes diffusion more likely when the two governments are 'closer' in terms of their domestic circumstances, political leanings, or economic aims.

3.1 Learning

Learning is a pragmatic form of information evaluation that focuses on the use of restrictions and their objective outcomes. Leaders' examples are more likely to diffuse if they create more positive results or fewer negative ones (Weyland 2005; Gilardi 2010). The learning process also includes sameness-in-context between two jurisdictions (Gilardi 2016; Nicholson-Crotty and Carley 2016; Beazer and Blake 2018). Similar to the logic of consequentiality (March and Olsen 1984), laggards rationally compare local factors to refine their expectations regarding

[6] When laggards consider unwinding restrictions, leaders are those that enforce fewer restrictions.

[7] Scholars study diffusion as both binary phenomena, as in the cases above, and on an interval wherein multiple laws or individual components comprise a broader policy (Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty 2011; Yu, Jennings, and Butler 2020).



Figure 3: Diffusion Mechanisms

whether desired outcomes observed in leader jurisdictions will replicate locally. The concept is sufficiently broad to include both state and non-state actors. Since existing research has not consistently found evidence that either the number of CSOs or their general character accelerates adoption,we focus on state bureaucracy and the judiciary as unstudied vectors of diffusion.

State bureaucracies shape the implementation environment through their capacity to produce, manage, and purposefully employ state resources to realize policy goals (Evans 1995, Finegold and Skocpol 1995). 'Capacity' on its own cannot distinguish between normatively good or bad outcomes. Taylor (2011, pp. 16-17) explains that capacity in Putin's Russia is "the ability of [government] to ensure the reliable implementation of its decision by its own personnel" (see also Hassan 2020). Autocrats are shown to improve public education

capacity as a means to redistribute resources, promote loyalty, and nation-build (Paglayan 2021). Applied to CSO restrictions, capacity development involves using state resources to surveil, preempt, co-opt, and control civil society. 'Quality,' by contrast, is the ability of the state "to serve the interest of the population in a fair manner that promotes the general welfare" (Taylor 2011, pp. 16-17). Quality is the equitable, effective, and constitutionally defensible delivery of public service goods (Mettler and Soss 2004; Brass 2012). Weber (1922) identifies the two principal features of bureaucratic quality: enforcing rules impartially and hiring according to competency (see also Cornell, Knutsen, and Teorell 2020).

For example, Egyptian and Chinese state actors enforced more than twice the global average number of restrictions between 1994 and 2014 in constitutional contexts that protect the freedom to associate and assemble.[8] Wiktorowicz (2000) and Spires (2011) stress a necessary feature of implementation environments with widespread restrictions is the presence of a bureaucracy willing to comply with an executive's arbitrary use of power. In Egypt, a complicit bureaucracy is fundamental to creating the administrative power necessary to penetrate society and make collective action observable and controllable (Wiktorowicz 2000). The same is true in China, where bureaucrats turn a blind eye to ostensibly illegal organizations as long as local officials can appropriate CSOs' charitable works and contribute positively to their annual performance reports (Spires 2011). If laggard governments are considering changing their restrictions to match the Egyptian or Chinese leaders, the learning process predicts diffusion is conditional on the laggard having an implementation environment in which the bureaucracy can and will enforce *de facto* restrictions that may contravene laws

[8] Data on constitutions retrieved from the Comparative Constitutions Project (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2014).

and constitutional protections.

Comparative evidence shows that the judiciary and civil society exert a positive and reciprocal relationship. The judiciary shapes the implementation environment by checking executive action and protecting individual rights. Its role is strongest when state actors comply with judicial rulings and the judiciary independently conducts its business. Civil society has shown itself effective at leading reform efforts for constitutional change (Mutunga 1999; Domingo 2004), bolstering judicial independence (Moustafa 2003), and providing public support that pressures elected leaders to comply with judicial rulings (Gloppen 2003; Staton 2004, 2010).

We argue that laggard governments are more likely to utilize restrictions in a manner similar to a leader if the two states have similar implementation environments, and less likely to learn from leaders whose implementation environments are too different. We present the first pair of testable hypotheses:[9]

> HYPOTHESIS 1: The greater the distance between a laggard state's and its leader's implementation environment, the smaller a government's movement towards the leader's CSO restriction bundle (either adding or removing restrictions).

3.2 Emulation

Emulation is a sociological form of diffusion that explains policy change as imitation. A common approach to studying emulation is through a process of normative pressure, or

[9] The BMBA data makes it possible to test our hypotheses for restrictions added and restrictions removed outcomes.

'neighborhood effect.' Researchers critique the 'neighborhood effects' approach for oversimplifying a complex sociological process as an average effect across all prior geographically-proximate adopters (Boehmke 2009; Volden 2006). A more rigorous treatment of the emulation process uses a more precise mechanism to measure diffusion. Similar to the 'logic of appropriateness', which guides behavior through a mutual understanding of what is reasonable, right, and good (March and Olsen 1984), emulation socializes laggards as to what is appropriate and acceptable, causing them to mimic leaders for reasons separate from the policies or their objective consequences. Emulation occurs when laggards imitate a leader because of its strong reputation and credibility (Gray 1973), shared culture and common histories (Berinzon and Briggs 2019), or similar ideological and democratic convictions (Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson 2004; Baldwin, Carley, and Nicholson-Crotty 2019). We focus on nationalism and personalistic appeal as the factors that facilitate emulation.

East Africa provides an example of how the emulation might unfold. Between 1994 and 1999, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Kenya had similar nationalist ideologies (77th-89th percentiles) and enforced two or fewer restrictions each year.[10] Ethiopia and Rwanda maintained their nationalist ideologies through 2013. In 2000, Ethiopia added two new restrictions and continued adding new restrictions throughout the period, peaking at seven in 2011. Rwanda added one restriction in 2000, two more in 2001, and enforced roughly the same number of restrictions per year as Ethiopia (five restrictions per year). In Kenya, by contrast, nationalism began to weaken in 2000, which muted the emulation mechanism despite close proximity to Ethiopian and Rwandan leaders. Kenya's ideological divergence led to it averaging only two restrictions per year.

[10] Data on nationalist ideology are from V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2020).

Nationalism celebrates national uniqueness and prioritizes national identity, unity, and autonomy as political preferences, affecting both democratic and autocratic regime change (Gellner 1983; Tamir 2019). Cheng (2012) notes that nationalism inherently prioritizes collective interests over individual human rights. In non-democracies, nationalist governments are less likely to respect the freedom of association, assembly, and due process (Yazici 2019). Nationalism can influence the speed and depth of democratization and preempt autocratic consolidation when incumbent autocrats face strong anti-incumbent nationalist opponents (Way 2005; Goode 2012). Nationalism's validity as a measure of ideology within the emulation process depends whether laggard governments agree that altering current restrictions is normatively acceptable and appropriate.[11]

Personalistic appeal is a "competing" informal institution found primarily in the developing and post-communist world that stands as a significant barrier to democratization (R. Snyder 1992; Bratton and Walle 1997; Lindberg 2003). It pervades governmental institutions and structures incentives in competition with formal rules (Clapham 1985, Helmke and Levitsky

[11] It is necessary to at least consider the possibility that the variable represents autocratic learning. Exploring the relationship between nationalism and regime type assuages mismeasurement concerns because nationalism is not an ideology reserved for autocrats. V-Dem's country expert responses show a weak relationship between liberal democracy and nationalist ideology ($\rho = -0.14$). The data show that nationalism is not an ideology reserved for autocrats. In our sample, 897 observations with nationalist ideologies in the top-quartile divide as non-democracies (449 observations) and democracies (448 observations). These countries include 16 closed autocracies (96 observations) and 13 liberal democracies (148 observations).

2004, p. 729). Nationalism and personalistic appeal rewrite what is right and reasonable, guiding actors to violate formal rules with impunity, while those who follow the law face consequences.

We argue that laggards change their restrictions to emulate the rules-in-use by leaders with similar means of legitimation. Conversely, laggards are less likely to emulate leaders as these legitimation measures diverge. We hypothesize that:

> HYPOTHESIS 2: The greater the distance between a laggard state's and its leaders' ideology, the smaller a government's movement towards the leader's CSO restriction bundle (either adding or removing restrictions).

3.3 Competitive Adjustment

Competitive adjustment is an economic form of information evaluation. This process predicts that governments voluntarily alter restrictions to gain or protect a competitive advantage for economic resources. Researchers have repeatedly identified this process when studying the global diffusion of tax and trade policies, welfare programs, and economic development (Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006; Obinger and Schmitt 2011).

CSO restrictions are not economic policies, but a government's decision to enforce them can affect economic resources beyond foreign assistance. As Simmons and Elkins (2004, p. 173) argue, "traders and investors are drawn to locations where they can do business more freely and securely. Anticipating this outcome [creates] the possibility of competition among jurisdictions, at least on the margins, for international economic activity." Extending their argument, we expect that whatever posture a government takes towards private CSOs correlates with how traders and investors perceive the business environment. This has two implications for governments that seek to restrict CSOs. First, it is not necessarily

disadvantageous to enforce restrictions if laggards observe leaders with similar economic resources enforcing similar restrictions. Second, increasing foreign investment may require unwinding restrictions to burnish the country's image to foreign investors. We predict that higher levels of foreign investments and the need to project a free and secure environment for private organizations should, at least marginally, prevent or reduce restrictions.

Christensen and Weinstein (2013) provide the canonical example, with Belarus and Kazakhstan enforcing a similar number of restrictions (averaging four) between 1994 and 1999. Over that period, foreign direct investment averaged 1.4 percent and 5.6 percent of GDP for Lukashenka's Belarus and Nazarbayev's Kazakhstan, respectively. In the 2000s, while the US and EU used economic sanctions and promises of improved economic relations with the EU to persuade Lukashenka to permit more freedoms, Lukashenka opted to bolster economic relations with Russia (p. 86). Belarus incrementally added restrictions in the years that followed: two in 2000, two in 2001, and a ninth in 2009. Foreign investment hovered at one percent of GDP as Lukashenka expanded restrictions, while in 2007, perhaps due to stronger economic ties with Russia, foreign investment increased to four percent of GDP. Comparatively, Nazarbayev oscillated between adding and removing restrictions between 2000 and 2013 and averaged fewer than four restrictions per year, with foreign investment averaging more than nine percent of GDP during the same period.

We argue that governments want to retain and increase economic resources, which includes foreign investment. Governments can undermine this goal if they overuse restrictions, but foreign investors may tolerate some restrictions, especially if those investors come from countries enforcing similar restrictions (Beazer and Blake 2018). We expect governments' decisions to add or remove restrictions is influenced——at least on the margins——by the restrictions their economic competitors use. We hypothesize that:

HYPOTHESIS 3: The greater the dissimilarity between a laggard state's and its leader's international investment and trade positions, the smaller a government's movement towards the leader's CSO restriction bundle (either adding or removing restrictions).

4 Empirics

We test our empirical predictions using the BMBA global dataset to measure governments' changing policies towards CSOs between 1994 and 2014. To analyze the influence a foreign government has on another's domestic policy, we transform 3,650 country-year observations into directed-dyads. This dyadic approach provides valuable empirical insights for studying two actor interactions while controlling for non-dyadic independent variables (Poast 2016; Diehl and Wright 2016).[12] The transformation nests 30,450 unique directed-dyads within countries to produce an initial sample of 630,428 directed-dyad year observations.

The problem we confront concerns statistical inference. Unless corrected, repeatedly counting country-level variables' thousands of times across directed-dyad observations will dramatically under-estimate standard errors. We use multilevel models to correct for this as we study how dyadic relationships affect policy choices. In addition to ensuring that our standard errors are appropriately sized, the multilevel model allows us to use random coefficients to account for unobserved heterogeneity between and within groups (Gelman and

[12] We apply this approach conservatively because using directed-dyads may produce false positives if applied to the wrong level of analysis (Cranmer and Desmarais 2016).

Hill 2007). The model specification for time t is:

$$Y_i = [\gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}X_{ij} + \gamma_{01}W_j + \gamma_{11}W_jX_{ij}] + [u_{0j} + u_{1j}X_{ij} + r_{ij}]$$

Where Y_i is the number of restrictions changed by country i at time t (country i is the laggard in a directional-dyad with country j); γ_{00} is the random intercept estimate for country i; γ_{10} is the slope coefficient for the relationship between each level-1 predictor and the response variable; γ_{01} is the slope coefficient for the relationship between each level-2 predictor and the response variable; u_{0j} and u_{1j} are the disturbance terms for the randomly varying slope coefficients and random intercept, respectively; and r_{ij} is the level-1 standard error.

4.1 Response Variables

We examine direction and magnitude of change in states' CSO restrictions. The data provides country-year measures for the prevalence of ten restrictions.[13] There are three possible

[13] The BMBA data codes the following restrictions: (1) banning specific CSOs; (2) curtailing travel; (3) restricting CSOs' visits to government sites; (4) limiting CSOs' domestic funding sources; (5) limiting CSOs' international funding sources; (6) creating difficulties in obtaining visas or denying visas; (7) creating difficulties in registering as CSOs; (8) censoring CSOs' publications; (9) harassing civil society activists; and (10) surveilling civil society activists. Values from France—the only liberal democracy and permanent UN Security Council member to use restrictions—complete missing data for the USA. Findings are robust when we use values from the UK, which does not use restrictions, to complete missing values for the USA.

outcomes in a given year: maintain the status quo, add restrictions, or remove restrictions. Our response variable is the year-over-year change in the count of the number of restrictions in use. As the underlying processes may differ between adding and removing restrictions, we split the sample into net additions and subtractions. Observations in which laggards maintain the status quo exist in both subsets.

4.2 Explanatory Variables

For each explanatory variable, we construct a measure of 'distance' defined as the dissimilarity in responses between leader and laggard countries. We calculate these variables as the absolute value of the difference in each dyad's base-level domestic factor (implementation environment, political ideology, and foreign investment). Higher values indicate a greater distance—or equivalently, less similarity—between countries. Unless otherwise noted, all explanatory and control variables are lagged one year from the response variables.

4.2.1 Implementation Environment Similarity

We argue that the closer two states are in terms of their implementation environment, the more likely the laggard government will learn from the leader whether to add or remove restrictions (***H1***). Our primary measure of the implementation environment *Impartial Bureaucracy*, defined as the bureaucracy's ability to resist the executive's arbitrary use of the state apparatus to restrict and repress civil society. The indicator measures "the extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike, or conversely, the extent to which public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and biases as they handle the cases of ordinary people" (Coppedge et al. 2020, p. 164). Our alternative measure is *Judicial Constraint*, defined as the ability of the judiciary and formal

legal institutions to constrain executive action. The indicator measures the extent to which the executive respects the constitution, complies with court rulings, and the judiciary acts in an independent manner (Coppedge et al. 2020, p. 319). Impartial bureaucracy and judicial constraint are interval variables with higher values indicating increased impartiality and judicial constraints.[14]

4.2.2 Political Ideology Similarity

We predict that the closer two governments are in terms of political ideology, the more likely the laggard government will emulate the leader when deciding to add or remove restrictions (***H2***). Our primary measure of political ideology is the extent to which the government promotes nationalism. The measure is the multiplicative product of separate questions focused on the degree to which the current government promotes a specific ideology or societal model (*Ideological Strength*) and whether that ideology is nationalist (*Nationalism*) (p. 208). Increasing values indicate that the government more muscularly promotes a nationalist ideology. Our alternative measure is *Personal Authority*, defined as the extent to which personalistic forms of authority pervade formal institutions. This indicator measures whether the governing regime combines clientelistic relationships, an unconstrained executive, and the use of public resources for political legitimization (p. 273). Higher values indicate greater levels of personal authority.[15]

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[14] Correlation between indicators is 0.49.

[15] Correlation between indicators is 0.10.

4.2.3 International Investment Similarity

We expect that the closer two states are in attracting international investment, the more likely the laggard government will choose to compete with the leader for economic resources by narrowing the distance in the number of restrictions used (***H3***). We use only one measure to test this hypothesis. *Foreign Investment* is the net inflow of new financial investment as a percentage of GDP. The indicator measures new investment inflows less disinvestment in equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, and long- and short-term capital (World Bank 2020).

4.3 Controls

Our analysis includes variables that account for differences in formal institutions, current restrictions, domestic politics, ties to the international system, and temporal interdependence. We include these for the purpose of testing whether a diffusion effect exists even when controlling for the prominent domestic explanations that exist in current research. We discuss each group in turn and summarize all variables and their data sources in the supplemental information.

Four contemporaneous variables control for preexisting formal institutions. United Nations Office of Legal Affairs (2018) provides information on each country's International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) ratification status. ICCPR ratification decreases the probability of adopting *de jure* restrictions but increases the use of *de facto* ones (DeMattee 2019; Bakke, Mitchell, and Smidt 2020). *ICCPR Ratification* measures whether a country has made an international commitment to safeguard human rights. Three variables account for the composition of constitutions. The Comparative Constitutions Project provides data for

these variables (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2014). *Treaties Superior* identifies the status a particular constitutional system gives international agreements vis-à-vis ordinary legislation. *Right to Associate* identifies whether the constitution explicitly provides for the freedom of association. *Executive Power Index* is a summative index that controls for differences in constitutional rules governing the relationship between executives and legislatures.[16]

We account for a government's current use of restrictions for two purposes. First, it informs how large a change in restrictions can be. Governments that enforce a large number of restrictions have fewer restrictions to add in the following year; those same contexts also have more restrictions that they can remove in the following year. The second reason is to provide immediate historical context for changes in the response variable. Accounting for current restrictions helps differentiate the 'no change' outcome for governments that never use restrictions——e.g., Canada——versus others that maintain the same high number of restrictions for several years——e.g., Belarus enforced seven restrictions 2003-2006, and eight restrictions 2010-2014. Following others who have used the BMBA data, we weigh all restrictions equally.We categorize the restrictions into four subgroups——*Governance*, *Formation*, *Operations*, and *Resources*——to capture differences between governments using an identical number of restrictions.

A vector of domestic variables accounts for political and socioeconomic differences. CSOs can be valuable allies in delivering public service and convenient vehicles that prevent opposition leaders from credit-claiming government programs (Lorch and Bunk 2017; Bueno 2018). However, under different circumstances, CSOs may threaten a government's legitimacy (Brass 2016; Nelson-Nuñez 2019). *Performance Legitimacy* controls for the varying degree to

[16] For coding rules see Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2012.

which the government refers to policy performance to justify its regime (Coppedge et al. 2020, p. 209).

While some CSOs provide public service goods, others exist to advocate for civil liberties and good governance. Such CSOs are not necessarily problematic for governments because regimes can co-opt them for their own gain, making the legal form another vehicle for corruption. Lewis (2013) and Dimitrovova (2010) explain that corrupt governments use these legal forums to attract and usurp charitable funds to expand their own resources.[17] *Political Corruption* is a broad index that controls for the pervasiveness of political corruption among public sector employees, members of the executive, members of the legislature, and the judiciary (Coppedge et al. 2020, p. 279).

Researchers propose different arguments and reach different conclusions on the relationship between political competition and governments' CSO policies. Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash (2016, p. 304) argue that competitive elections do not independently increase the risk of new restrictions, but have a moderating effect on the relationship between foreign aid and restrictions. Lorch and Bunk (2017, p. 999) maintain that the relationship between electoral competition and restrictions is not straightforward. They argue governments use several tactics to manipulate civil society to legitimize the regime.*Political Competition* controls for the relationship between electoral competition and restrictions. The variable measures the degree to which popular elections select the chief executive and legislature (Coppedge et al. 2020, p. 48).

Economic Development measures economic development as the natural-log of GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (World Bank 2020). *Ideal Point* uses roll-call

[17] See also Wischermann et al. 2018.

votes in the UN General Assembly to estimate dynamic government preferences on common issues (Voeten, Strezhnev, and Bailey 2018). The base variables that calculate dyadic distances provide additional controls: Impartial Bureaucracy, Judicial Constraint, Ideological Strength, Nationalism, Personal Authority, and Foreign Investment.

Several variables control for formal ties within the international community. *UNSC Member* identifies countries that members of the UN Security Council. *Leader is UNSC Member* identifies observations in which the leader country is UN Security Council member (Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009). *Joint IGO Membership* represents the number of common memberships a dyad has in international governmental organizations such as the African Union, NATO, and OAPEC (Pevehouse et al. 2020).

Cubic splines control for temporal dependency that may produce inferential errors. We choose cubic splines rather than fixed effects because they require estimating fewer coefficients, do not lead to quasi-complete separation, and improve model fit compared to dummy variables (Carter and Signorino 2010).

5 Findings

We find evidence consistent with our argument that foreign governments affect the decisions governments make to add or remove CSO restrictions. The emulation and strategic adjustment mechanisms increase the number of restrictions a government adds, whereas the learning mechanism appears to have no measurable effect. The emulation mechanism also affects governments' decisions to remove restrictions. We discuss adding and removing restrictions as separate analyses and then compare those findings to the importance of domestic factors in a mixed-model formulation that includes diffusion variables.

5.1 Governments Add Restrictions

Table 1 shows the results for when governments add restrictions. For clarity, the table presents only the main variables of interest; estimates for all other covariates appear in the supplemental information. Model 1 reports estimates for the formal institutions that are contemporaneous with the response variable, plus control variables. The next five columns individually test hypotheses. Models 2 and 3 test whether the learning mechanism predicts new restrictions (***H1***). Models 4 and 5 test the emulation mechanism (***H2***) and Model 6 tests competitive adjustment (***H3***). Model 7 simultaneously tests these mechanisms using the AIC to choose between models testing the same mechanism. We focus on Model 7 when interpreting results. Finally, Model 8 combines all measures.

Across most models and measures, the distance measures are negatively signed, indicating that as the distance between two jurisdictions increases, the diffusion effect dissipates. We find little evidence supporting our argument that restrictions spread via these learning mechanisms (***H1***). This suggests that similarity in the implementation environment fails to provide relevant information to governments deciding whether to deploy new restrictions. Still, state institutions remain relevant. Impartial bureaucracy negatively correlates with new restrictions, which signals that the more law abiding and impartial the bureaucracy is, the less the executive can deploy it to restrict CSOs. Executive power positively correlates with new restrictions, indicating that the more constitutional powers an executive has, the more muscular the expansion of restrictions.

We find evidence supporting our argument that emulation (***H2***) and strategic adjustment (***H3***) influence governments' decisions on how many new restrictions to deploy. For the average observation, the predicted number of new restrictions is 0.0016. This small scale is common with directed-dyadic analyses where tens of thousands of observations maintain the

Table 1: Government Adds Restrictions (Poisson Regression)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Distance (lagged):								
Judicial Distance		-0.053						-0.012
		(0.045)						(0.068)
Judicial Constraint	-0.080	-0.507 ***						-0.084
	(0.196)	(0.135)						(0.196)
Bureaucratic Distance			-0.017				-0.015	-0.011
			(0.011)				(0.011)	(0.012)
Impartial Bureaucracy	-0.526 ***		-0.474 ***				-0.534 ***	-0.516 ***
	(0.032)		(0.030)				(0.030)	(0.032)
Nationalist Distance				-0.064 ***			-0.058 **	-0.058 **
				(0.018)			(0.018)	(0.018)
Nationalism	1.386 ***			1.262 ***			1.388 ***	1.410 ***
	(0.112)			(0.113)			(0.111)	(0.112)
Ideological Strength	-0.231 ***			-0.200 ***			-0.231 ***	-0.239 ***
	(0.025)			(0.024)			(0.024)	(0.025)
Personalistic Distance					-0.066			-0.038
					(0.051)			(0.082)
Personal Authority	0.243				0.670 ***			0.241
	(0.246)				(0.172)			(0.247)
Investment Distance						-0.004 ***	-0.004 ***	-0.004 ***
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Foreign Investment Pct	-0.010 ***					-0.006 ***	-0.007 ***	-0.007 ***
	(0.001)					(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Domestic Institutions:								
Treaties Superior	0.759 ***	0.856 ***	0.910 ***	0.702 ***	0.839 ***	0.815 ***	0.760 ***	0.762 ***
	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.124)	(0.124)
ICCPR Ratification	0.009	-0.060	0.053	-0.136 *	-0.065	-0.106	0.002	0.009
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.064)
Degree of Executive Power	0.240 ***	0.215 ***	0.211 ***	0.261 ***	0.212 ***	0.221 ***	0.245 ***	0.240 ***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Treaties x ICCPR	3.252 *	4.562 **	3.596 *	5.261 ***	4.672 **	4.206 **	3.352 *	3.323 *
	(1.508)	(1.517)	(1.510)	(1.516)	(1.516)	(1.516)	(1.507)	(1.509)
Domestic (lagged):								
Political Competition	-0.111 **	-0.182 ***	-0.051	-0.252 ***	-0.173 ***	-0.198 ***	-0.114 **	-0.116 **
	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Corruption	0.752 ***	1.716 ***	0.821 ***	2.256 ***	1.513 ***	2.010 ***	0.956 ***	0.781 ***
	(0.217)	(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.177)	(0.215)	(0.175)	(0.190)	(0.217)
Performance Legitimacy	0.686 ***	0.572 ***	0.680 ***	0.594 ***	0.580 ***	0.589 ***	0.695 ***	0.684 ***
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Number of Observations	128,692	128,692	128,692	128,692	128,692	128,692	128,692	128,692
Number of Dyads	10,239	10,239	10,239	10,239	10,239	10,239	10,239	10,239
Number of Laggards/Leaders	146/127	146/127	146/127	146/127	146/127	146/127	146/127	146/127
AIC	112,798	113,403	113,153	113,225	113,401	113,284	112,775	112,779
BIC	113,130	113,696	113,446	113,528	113,694	113,577	113,117	113,160

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. SEs in parentheses.
See SI Table 6 for full results.

status quo.[18] At the dyadic level, dissimilarity in a dyad's level of nationalism negatively correlates with new restrictions. This means that as nationalist distance increases, the expected number of new restrictions decreases. Consistent with our argument, similarity in political ideology accelerates the diffusion of restrictions (***H2***).

The emulation mechanism increases the number of restrictions a government adds, but that expansion is conditional on other factors. Nationalism, for example, correlates with more muscular expansions of restrictions. For an otherwise average dyad, a standard deviation increase in a laggard's nationalism increases the predicted number of new restrictions 13 percent.[19] This is roughly the same as low nationalist countries moving from average to maximum similarity with respect to political ideology: for a laggard with nationalism one standard deviation below the mean—e.g., Burkina Faso and Guinea—emulation can increase the number of new restrictions more than 14 percent.[20] In a country with an average level of nationalism, emulation's maximum effect increases the number of new restrictions by over 38 percent.[21] For perspective, that relative change is larger than a two standard deviation increase in executive power.[22]

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[18] See Beazer and Blake 2018, p. 477. In a context where more than 80 percent of 128,692 observations maintain the status quo, small changes in the predicted outcomes can be substantial.

[19] +0.0002: from 0.0016 to 0.0018. Table 2 Column 2.

[20] +0.0002: from 0.0014 to 0.0016. Table 2 Row 6.

[21] +0.0005: from 0.0013 to 0.0018. Table 2 Row 5.

[22] +0.0004: from 0.0014 to 0.0018. Table 5 Row 2.

Table 2: Predicted Number of Restrictions Added

Laggard Base-level Conditions	*Otherwise Average Conditions*[a]			*Otherwise Ideal Conditions*[b]	
	Minimum Similarity	Average Similarity	Maximum Similarity	Minimum Similarity	Maximum Similarity
Impartial Bureaucracy					
Strong (+1SD)	0.0013	0.0013	0.0014	0.0008	0.009
Average	0.0015	0.0016	0.0017	0.0010	0.0011
Weak (-1SD)	0.0018	0.0019	0.0020	0.0012	0.0013
Nationalism					
Strong (+1SD)	0.0015	0.0018	0.0020	0.0010	0.0013
Average	0.0013	0.0016	0.0018	0.0009	0.0012
Weak (-1SD)	0.0012	0.0014	0.0016	0.0008	0.0010
Foreign Investment					
Strong (+1SD)	0.0003	0.0014	0.0023	0.0002	0.0015
Average	0.0003	0.0016	0.0025	0.0002	0.0017
Weak (-1SD)	0.0004	0.0018	0.0029	0.0003	0.0019

Estimated using Model 7 in Table 1.
a. Conditional on distance and base-level shown, all other variables held at their mean.
b. Conditioned on minimal political corruption and maximum political competition.

The analyses also find evidence supporting our prediction that the closer two governments are in terms of attracting international investment, the more likely a laggard government will compete with leaders for resources by narrowing——or keeping narrow——the distance in the number of restrictions it uses (***H3***). Domestically, higher foreign investment levels predict governments add fewer restrictions. This is interpretable as governments capable of attracting foreign investment are those that use fewer restrictions. At the dyadic-level, dissimilarity in a dyad's foreign investment levels negatively correlates with new restrictions. For an otherwise average dyad and a laggard with an average level of foreign investment, moving from average to maximum similarity with respect to foreign investment increases the number of new restrictions more than 50 percent.[23] Together, these findings offer three insights. One, for a laggard with average foreign investment in an otherwise average dyad, taking the necessary actions to increase future foreign investment by one standard deviation

[23] +0.0009: from 0.0016 to 0.0025. Table 2 Row 8.

decreases the predicted size of new restrictions by more than 12 percent.[24] Two, the laggard's actions to attract foreign investment increase the dyad's investment distance in later periods. Increased distance further decreases the number of new restrictions added. The final insight is that countries that lose foreign investment to the laggard are worse off in two ways. According to our model, the immediate effect of lower foreign investment is more restrictions. Holding all variables constant, a standard deviation decrease in foreign investment increases the size of new restrictions by 12 percent. As an indirect effect, losing foreign investment almost certainly means fewer jobs, less tax revenue, and a smaller economy.

5.2 Governments Remove Restrictions

Our second analysis studies whether diffusion affects governments' decisions to soften CSO restrictions. Table 3 presents our results on a sample of 111 states that soften or maintain their restrictions. This sample contains fewer countries because 35 countries never used restrictions and it is impossible for them to remove those practices. Many of these are consolidated democracies—e.g., Belgium and New Zealand—that influence other governments through their role as leaders. Still, the BMBA data contains strong democracies that use restrictions—e.g., France and Japan—and exist in the sample as laggards capable of removing restrictions.

The diffusion process variables are signed consistent with theory, but only the emulation mechanism (***H2***) reliably predicts outcomes. Foreign investment distance, which explains why governments add restrictions fails to predict when governments remove them. We argue that this null result exists because the mechanism is asymmetrical. When a government

[24] -0.0002: from 0.0016 to 0.0014. Table 2 Row 8.

Table 3: Government Removes Restrictions (Poisson Regression)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Distance (lagged):								
Judicial Distance		-0.037					-0.010	-0.025
		(0.034)					(0.034)	(0.052)
Judicial Constraint	2.249 ***	1.566 ***					2.016 ***	2.243 ***
	(0.140)	(0.109)					(0.119)	(0.141)
Bureaucratic Distance			0.003					0.011
			(0.007)					(0.008)
Impartial Bureaucracy	-0.242 ***		-0.018					-0.240 ***
	(0.027)		(0.024)					(0.027)
Nationalist Distance				-0.037 **			-0.037 **	-0.038 **
				(0.013)			(0.013)	(0.013)
Nationalism	1.207 ***			1.411 ***			1.161 ***	1.233 ***
	(0.085)			(0.083)			(0.083)	(0.085)
Ideological Strength	0.337 ***			0.189 ***			0.329 ***	0.339 ***
	(0.022)			(0.021)			(0.022)	(0.022)
Personalistic Distance					-0.017			-0.005
					(0.036)			(0.059)
Personal Authority	-0.312 *				-1.249 ***			-0.313 *
	(0.146)				(0.122)			(0.147)
Investment Distance						-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
						(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Foreign Investment Pct	0.007 ***					0.008 ***	0.007 ***	0.007 ***
	(0.001)					(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Domestic Institutions:								
Treaties Superior	-4.949 ***	-4.799 ***	-4.786 ***	-4.797 ***	-4.794 ***	-4.775 ***	-4.833 ***	-4.941 ***
	(0.184)	(0.183)	(0.184)	(0.183)	(0.184)	(0.184)	(0.183)	(0.183)
ICCPR Ratification	0.110 **	-0.033	0.060	0.127 ***	0.027	0.051	0.016	0.109 **
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.039)
Degree of Executive Power	-0.217 ***	-0.198 ***	-0.234 ***	-0.245 ***	-0.213 ***	-0.231 ***	-0.217 ***	-0.217 ***
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Treaties x ICCPR	-15.985	-19.474	-19.518	-16.032	-19.238	-18.691	-14.658	-15.930
	(53.134)	(51.474)	(52.580)	(54.352)	(52.306)	(50.848)	(51.927)	(53.162)
Domestic (lagged):								
Political Competition	0.119 ***	0.083 **	0.089 **	0.068 *	0.043	0.092 **	0.077 **	0.117 ***
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Corruption	-0.728 ***	-0.513 **	-1.610 ***	-1.872 ***	-0.669 ***	-1.563 ***	-0.562 ***	-0.715 ***
	(0.182)	(0.167)	(0.160)	(0.154)	(0.175)	(0.152)	(0.170)	(0.182)
Performance Legitimacy	0.773 ***	0.497 ***	0.508 ***	0.686 ***	0.529 ***	0.514 ***	0.720 ***	0.768 ***
	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Number of Observations	110,485	110,485	110,485	110,485	110,485	110,485	110,485	110,485
Number of Dyads	10,266	10,266	10,266	10,266	10,266	10,266	10,266	10,266
Number of Laggards/Leaders	111/162	111/162	111/162	111/162	111/162	111/162	111/162	111/162
AIC	181,182	181,790	181,997	181,587	181,891	181,937	181,259	181,180
BIC	181,509	182,078	182,286	181,885	182,180	182,225	181,595	181,555

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. SEs in parentheses.
See SI Table 7 for full results.

hostile to civil society considers adding restrictions, they play a defensive strategy to protect economic resources. Seeing leaders with more restrictions and similar foreign investment levels updates the laggard's priors that increasing restrictions will not—or is less likely to—jeopardize future economic resources. Laggards that seek to increase foreign investment will strategically remove restrictions to attract resources from countries receiving greater inflows. However, measuring foreign investment distance as the absolute distance between two countries cannot differentiate leaders with lower foreign investment and those with higher foreign investment. Stated simply, the diffusion processes that we test here, which we hypothesize operate the same when increasing or decreasing restrictions, require further theorizing concerning whether they operate consistently for adding and removing restriction policies.

Table 4: Predicted Number of Restrictions Removed

	Otherwise Average Conditions[a]			*Otherwise Ideal Conditions*[b]	
Laggard Base-level Conditions	Minimum Similarity	Average Similarity	Maximum Similarity	Minimum Similarity	Maximum Similarity
Judicial Control					
Weak (-1SD)	0.3664	0.3691	0.3717	0.4321	0.4384
Average	0.4306	0.4364	0.4368	0.5078	0.5151
Strong (+1SD)	0.5162	0.5199	0.5237	0.6088	0.6175
Nationalism					
Weak (-1SD)	0.3565	0.3963	0.4271	0.4205	0.5036
Average	0.3912	0.4364	0.4686	0.4614	0.5226
Strong (+1SD)	0.4343	0.4828	0.5202	0.5122	0.6135
Foreign Investment					
Weak (-1SD)	0.3776	0.4175	0.4316	0.4452	0.5089
Average	0.3946	0.4364	0.4511	0.4654	0.5320
Strong (+1SD)	0.4125	0.4561	0.4715	0.4864	0.5560

Estimated using Model 7 in Table 3.
a. Conditional on distance and base-level shown, all other variables held at their mean.
b. Conditioned on minimal political corruption and maximum political competition.

The predicted number of restrictions removed for an otherwise average observation is 0.4364 (Table 4, Column 2). This average predicted outcome is larger than the prior analysis because nearly every country that enforces restrictions also removes restrictions. Conditional on an average level of nationalism, emulation's maximum relative effect can

increase the number of restrictions removed by 20 percent,[25] Under these same initial conditions, emulation's maximum effect is equal to replacing average levels of corruption and political competition with ideal conditions where corruption is minimal and competition is robust.[26] We can interpret this to mean that emulation affects a government's choice to change its restrictions in a magnitude that is similar to key domestic factors such as corruption and political competition.

5.3 Domestic Explanations for Adding and Removing Restrictions

The focus of our analysis has been to empirically test whether leaders affect a laggard's decision to add or remove restrictions. While the directed-dyadic approach appropriately tests these dyadic inter-dependencies, the multilevel approach allows our analyses to comment on the domestic factors that existing research finds relevant.[27] The results in Models 7 and 8 of Tables 1 and 3 show the constellation of variables controlling for formal institutions are robust predictors in both our analyses.[28] Conditional on constitutions making international

[25] +0.0774: from 0.3912 to 0.4686. Table 4 Row 5.

[26] +0.0702: from 0.3912 to 0.4614. Table 4 Columns 2 and 4.

[27] Discussing domestic factors alongside our diffusion hypotheses raises the problem of multiple comparisons. When comparing seven hypotheses simultaneously, the Bonferroni correction leads us to test each hypothesis at $\alpha/\beta = 0.05/7 = 0.007$. The results of our diffusion hypotheses are unchanged at this threshold.

[28] Table 5 shows the predicted effect of a discrete change in domestic factors conditional on all other factors—including diffusion mechanisms—held at their means.

treaties superior to ordinary legislation, ICCPR ratification weakly predicts that governments will expand restrictions ($p < 0.05$). Executive power, by contrast, is a strong predictor in both analyses. Constitutional systems that give more power to the executive tend to add more restrictions ($p < 0.001$) and remove fewer ones ($p < 0.001$). Indeed, for the otherwise average country, increasing executive power by two standard deviations increases the number of new restrictions by over 28 percent, and decreases the number of restrictions removed by over 23 percent (Table 5 Row 2). Political corruption has the same relationship: higher levels of corruption beget a larger number of restrictions added ($p < 0.001$) and a smaller number removed ($p < 0.001$). As Table 5 suggests, corruption has a smaller effect than executive power in both analyses. Finally, environments with strong political competition add fewer restrictions ($p = 0.006$) and remove more ($p = 0.008$). Note that a one standard deviation increase in political competition decreases the number of new restrictions by almost 5% and increases the number removed by 3%. In relative terms, political competition appears to offset only half of the effect of political corruption.

Table 5: Predicted Number of Restrictions Conditional on Domestic Factors

	Adds Restrictions			*Removes Restrictions*		
	Weak[a]	Strong[b]	Change[c]	Weak[a]	Strong[b]	Change[c]
ICCPR Ratification	0.0016	0.0016	+0.6%	0.0016	0.0016	+0.6%
Executive Power	0.0014	0.0018	+28.5%	0.4974	0.3827	-23.1%
Political Corruption	0.0015	0.0017	+10.0%	0.4505	0.4235	-6.0%
Political Competition	0.0016	0.0015	-4.6%	0.4295	0.4433	+3.2%

Marginal effects calculated using Model 7 in Tables 1 and 3 with all other variables held at their mean.
a. Marginal effects calculated with variable at 0 (binary) or 1 standard deviation below the mean (continuous).
b. Marginal effects calculated with variable at 1 (binary) or 1 standard deviation above the mean (continuous).
c. Relative change in the prediction moving from weak to strong conditions.

5.4 Robustness Tests

Our primary results are robust to different model specifications and alternative measures of the response variables. We describe the motivation and findings for these tests and direct readers to the Supporting Information (SI) for further detail.

First, we test the possibility that results are sensitive to some unmeasured aspect of the response variable measuring the number of restrictions a government uses. We do this by replacing the response variables used above with similar measures from different sources (see SI Table 8). While most of the domestic factors remain consistently signed and significant, the effects of the diffusion mechanisms are sensitive to the datat set. Our emulation hypothesis replicates in the 'adds' analysis with V-Dem's *de facto* measure, but this is not the case in the 'removes' analysis. Our diffusion results do not replicate when using the *de jure* measure in the Glasius dataset.

Second, we evaluate whether our results change if we use alternate techniques to account for the nested nature of the data (SI Table 9). Models that use robust standard errors and robust clustered standard errors remove some of the bias within the variance of the baseline fixed effects model, but point estimates and the standard errors are severely biased when excluding random effects. The results show that the multilevel model fits this data better than other techniques, and is more conservative because it produces generally smaller effects and fewer statistically significant results.

Third, we consider the possibility that distances have a nonlinear effect. To do so, we test both the the linear-distance measure and a squared-distance measure. Our primary findings are unchanged when using nonlinear measures to test distance. Including variables that measure distance coarsely, such as adjacent land and proximate sea borders, or neighborhood effects, do not change our findings. Overall, our findings support our chosen specification,

given our data, but show that changes in the construction of the response variable or the sample size provide limits to the generalizability of our findings.

6 Conclusion

Scholars and human rights defenders give increased attention to governments repressing local civil society actors. Many analysts link domestic factors, such as an autocrat's desire to stay in power or a regime's aim to stifle political competition, with a sudden and permanent expansion of CSO restrictions. By testing precise diffusion mechanisms, this study reveals that the international community influences governments regarding how much they restrict CSOs. Our findings show that foreign governments act as 'role-models' and 'innovators' when laggards are considering whether to maintain or alter their current CSO policies. Emulation and strategic adjustment mechanisms increase the number of restrictions a government adds, whereas the learning mechanism appears to have no measurable effect. Emulation plays a key role in governments' decisions to remove restrictions. While diffusion is most likely when governments share political ideologies, local factors remain relevant. Our analyses suggest governments add the most restrictions when the head of government enjoys considerable constitutional powers and public corruption is widespread. In contrast, higher levels of political competition and bureaucratic impartiality reduce the number of restrictions a government adds.

Empirically, we show that governments' CSO restrictions are not permanent. The number of countries enforcing at least one restriction peaked at nearly 100 in 2000, and regressed by almost 25 percent by 2014. By the end of the period, the number of countries enforcing restrictions is roughly the same as those enforcing restrictions in 1994. What is more, we

find that ninety of 135 states removed at least two restrictions enforced the year prior. Internationally, the emulation mechanism improves this regulatory softening; domestically, factors such as effective judicial constraints and high political competition increase the number of restrictions the government removes.

We did not find support for a learning mechanism in our analyses studying restrictions' incremental change. Our analysis focused on a particular type of mechanism—similarity in the implementation environment—and does not rule out the possibility that other mechanisms may be operating. In particular, we expect future research applying diffusion's learning mechanism to the spread of restrictions will be fruitful after researchers identify a causal relationship between restrictions and their objective outcomes——e.g., restrictions successfully preventing democratization, prolonging an executive's term, or silencing dissent.

The data and our analyses dispel two perceptions and challenge a third that analysts tend to make regarding CSO restrictions. First, restrictions are widespread and not rare events like coups and civil wars. However, governments rarely make significant adjustments to the restrictions currently used. Two separate teams of social scientists (Bakke, Mitchell, and Smidt 2020; Glasius, Schalk, and De Lange 2020) provide data showing incrementalism as the dominant strategy for how governments erect restrictive policies: governments add only one or two restrictions in eighty-six percent of expansions in our primary analysis, and over seventy-five percent cent in confirmatory analysis. This tells us that incremental shifts in restrictions is the rule and not the exception.

Second, these data also tell us that restrictions are not isolated to non-democracies or developing countries. A non-trivial number of democracies—e.g., Iceland and Japan—and rich countries—e.g., Austria and Singapore—use them, too. Ignoring this fact biases our research in the short term and severely limits our theory going forward.

Finally, restrictions may not be the authoritarian innovation that many claim them to be. In the first year of our sample, seventy-four of 166 countries enforced restrictions. Extrapolating from this leads us to expect that restrictions exist as far back as researchers are willing to look, including Huntington's three waves, civil rights movements, and colonialism. If this is true, today's illiberal CSO restrictions may be as much a product of path-dependency as they are of international diffusion and domestic circumstances.

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Supporting Information for The Global Diffusion of Civil Society Restrictions, 1994-2014

CONTENTS

Description and Sources of Variables

Response Variables

- CSO Restrictions (integer, country-level). Primary response variable. Year-over-year change in the count of the number of restrictions in use measured at the country-level. Higher values indicate more restrictions in use. Source: Bakke, Mitchell, and Smidt 2020; Smidt et al. 2020.

- CSO Restrictions (integer, country-level). Alternate response variable. Year-over-year change in the count of the number of restrictive legal measures at the country-level. Higher values indicate more restrictions in use. Source: Glasius, Schalk, and De Lange 2020.

- CSO Repression (continuous, country-level). Alternate response variable. Year-over-year change in the government's amount of repression. Higher values indicate greater repression. Source: V-Dem indicator `v2csreprss` (2020: 182).[1]

Independent Variables

- Bureaucratic Distance (continuous, lagged, dyad-level). Measures similarity in a dyad's implementation environments (learning mechanism) calculated as the absolute difference in the level of impartial bureaucracy in two countries. Source: V-Dem indicator `v2clrspct` (2020: 164).

- Judicial Distance (continuous, lagged, dyad-level). Measures similarity in a dyad's implementation environments (learning mechanism) calculated as the absolute difference in the level of judicial constraint in two countries. Source: V-Dem indicator `e_v2x_jucon` (2020: 319).

- Nationalist Distance (continuous, lagged, dyad-level). Measures similarity in a dyad's political ideology (emulation mechanism) calculated as the absolute difference in the levels of nationalism and ideological strength in two countries. Source: V-Dem indicators `v2exl_legitideol` and `v2exl_legitideolcr_0` (2020: 208).

[1] All V-Dem indicators come from Coppedge et al. 2020.

- Personalistic Distance (continuous, lagged, dyad-level). Measures similarity in a dyad's political ideology (emulation mechanism) calculated as the absolute difference in the level of personal authority in two countries. Source: V-Dem indicator `v2x_neopat` (2020: 273).

- Investment Distance (continuous, lagged, dyad-level). Measures similarity in a dyad's ability to attract economic resources (competitive adjustment mechanism) calculated as the absolute difference in the level of foreign investment in two countries. Source: World Development Indicators (2020) indicator `BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS`.[2]

Control Variables: Formal Institutions

- International Commitment to Safeguard Civil and Political Rights (binary, country-level). Variable equals one if country ratified the ICCPR human rights treaty. ICCPR ratifications increased 26% during the period (from 123 to 155). Source: United Nations Office of Legal Affairs 2018.

- Constitution Bolsters International Commitments (binary, country-level). Variable equals one for all constitutional systems that explicitly make international agreements superior to ordinary legislation. The number of countries with this particular constitutional provision expanded 52% during the period (from 29 to 44). Source: Comparative Constitutions Project indicator `TREATST` (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2014, p. 93).

- Right to Associate (binary, country-level). Variable equals one for all constitutional systems that provides for the freedom of association. The number of countries with this constitutional right grew 32% during the period (from 93 to 123). Source: Comparative Constitutions Project indicator `ASSOC` (p. 119).

- Executive Power Index (integer, country-level). Additive index measuring the power the constitution gives the executive (for coding rules see Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2012)). Source: Comparative Constitutions Project (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2014) indicators: `AMNDPROP_1`, `AMNDPROP_2`, `AMNDPROP_3`, `HOSDEC`, `HOGDEC`, `EMDECL`, `LEGDISS`,

[2]All WDI come from World Bank 2020.

`LEG_IN_1`, `LEG_IN_2`, `LEG_IN_3`, `OVERPCT`, `CHALLEG_1`, `CHALLEG_2`, `CHALLEG_3`, `REFERENP_1`, `REFERENP_2`, `REFERENP_6`, `INVEXE`, `INTEXEC`, `LEGAPP`, `HOSIM`, and `HOGIMM`.

Control Variables: Current CSO Restrictions

- Governance Restrictions (integer, lagged, country-level). Whether the government currently harasses civil society activists or surveils civil society activists. Source: Bakke, Mitchell, and Smidt 2020; Smidt et al. 2020.

- Formation Restrictions (integer, lagged, country-level). Whether the government currently bans specific civil society organisations or creates difficulties in registering a CSO. Source: Bakke, Mitchell, and Smidt 2020; Smidt et al. 2020.

- Operations Restrictions (integer, lagged, country-level). Whether the government currently curtails CSOs' travel, restricts their visits to government sites, creates difficulties in obtaining visas or denying visas, or censors their publications. Source: Bakke, Mitchell, and Smidt 2020; Smidt et al. 2020.

- Resources Restrictions (integer, lagged, country-level). Whether the government currently limits CSOs' domestic funding sources or limits their international funding sources. Source: Bakke, Mitchell, and Smidt 2020; Smidt et al. 2020.

Control Variables: Domestic Factors

- Performance Legitimacy (continuous, lagged, country-level). The extent to which the government refers to performance (such as providing economic growth, poverty reduction, effective and non-corrupt governance, and/or providing security) in order to justify the regime in place? Ordinal responses (0=not at all, 4=exclusively) converted to interval by a measurement model. Source: V-Dem indicator `v2exl_legitperf` (2020: 209).

- Political Corruption (continuous, lagged, country-level). Index includes six measures of corruption that cover both different areas and levels of the polity realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption. The index accounts for several distinguished types of corruption: both 'petty' and 'grand'; both bribery and theft; both

corruption aimed at influencing law making and that affecting implementation. Interval variable (low to high) with larger values indicating higher levels of corruption. Source: V-Dem indicator `v2x_corr` (2020:279).

- Political Competition (continuous, lagged, country-level). This index attempts to measure (a) whether the chief executive is elected, either directly elected through popular elections or indirectly through a popularly elected legislature that then appoints the chief executive; and (b) whether the legislature, in presidential systems with a directly elected president that is also chief executive, is directly or indirectly elected. Note that a popular election is minimally defined and also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition. Similarly, "appointment" by legislature only implies selection and/or approval, not the power to dismiss. This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not necessarily be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right. Interval variable (low to high) with larger values indicating a greater prevalence of popular elections. Source: V-Dem indicator `v2x_elecoff` (2020:47).

- Economic Development (continuous, lagged, country-level). The natural log of GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity. Data are in constant 2017 international dollars. Source: World Bank Development Indicator `NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD` (2020).

- Impartial Bureaucracy (continuous, lagged, country-level). The extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike, or conversely, the extent to which public administration is characterised by arbitrariness and biases (i.e., nepotism, cronyism, or discrimination). The question covers the public officials that handle the cases of ordinary people. Ordinal responses (0= law is not respected by public officials, 4=law is generally fully respected by the public officials) converted to interval by a measurement model. If no functioning public administration exists, the lowest score (0) applies. Source: V-Dem indicator `v2clrspct` (2020: 164).

- Judicial Constraint (continuous, lagged, country-level). The extent to which the executive respects the constitution and complies with court rulings, and the extent to which the judiciary is able to act in an independent fashion. Interval variable (low to high) with

larger values indicating higher levels of judicial constraint.. Source: V-Dem indicator `v2x_jucon` (2020: 49).

- Ideological Strength (continuous, lagged, country-level). The extent to which the current government promotes a specific ideology or societal model (an officially codified set of beliefs used to justify a particular set of social, political, and economic relations; for example, socialism, nationalism, religious traditionalism, etc.) in order to justify the regime in place. Ordinal responses (0=not at all, 4=almost exclusively) converted to interval by a measurement model. Source: V-Dem indicator `v2exl_legitideol` (2020: 208).

- Nationalism (continuous, lagged, country-level). The extent to which the government's preferred ideology can be described as nationalistic. Source: V-Dem indicator `v2exl_legitideol_0` (2020: 208).

- Personal Authority (continuous, lagged, country-level). A Bayesian Factor Analysis of 16 indicators representing clientelistic political relationships, strong and unconstrained presidents, and the use of public resources for political legitimation creates this index measuring the extent to which rule is based on personal authority. Higher scores indicate higher levels of personal authority (a normatively worse—i.e., less democratic—situation). Source: V-Dem indicator `v2x_neopat0` (2020: 273).

- Foreign Investment (continuous, lagged, country-level). Net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors and is divided by GDP. Source: World Bank Development Indicator `BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS` (2020).

Control Variables: International Factors

- UNSC Member (binary, lagged, country-level). Equals one if the country is a temporary or permanent member of the UN Security Council. Source: Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009

- Ideal Point (continuous, lagged, country-level). A statistical model produces one-dimensional preferences that are comparable over time based on votes in the United Nations multi-dimensional issue space. These ideal point estimates have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. For precise calculation method, see Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017, p. 435-437) indicator `IdealPoint_x`.

- Joint IGO Memberships (integer, lagged, dyad-level). This variable measures the number of IGOs in which the dyad-pair has joint membership—i.e., both countries in the dyad simultaneously have full membership. It is not considered joint membership if either country is only an associate member or observer. The dataset tracks 534 IGOs, so it is mathematically possible for this variable to range from 0 to 534. Source: Pevehouse et al. 2020.

Full Regression Results

TABLE 6: Government Adds CSO Restrictions Poisson Regression, Full Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Distance (lagged):								
Judicial Distance		-0.053						-0.012
		(0.045)						(0.068)
Judicial Constraint	-0.080	-0.507 ***						-0.084
	(0.196)	(0.135)						(0.196)
Bureaucratic Distance			-0.017				-0.015	-0.011
			(0.011)				(0.011)	(0.012)
Impartial Bureaucracy	-0.526 ***		-0.474 ***				-0.534 ***	-0.516 ***
	(0.032)		(0.030)				(0.030)	(0.032)
Nationalist Distance				-0.064 ***			-0.058 **	-0.058 **
				(0.018)			(0.018)	(0.018)
Nationalism	1.386 ***			1.262 ***			1.388 ***	1.410 ***
	(0.112)			(0.113)			(0.111)	(0.112)
Ideological Strength	-0.231 ***			-0.200 ***			-0.231 ***	-0.239 ***
	(0.025)			(0.024)			(0.024)	(0.025)
Personalistic Distance					-0.066			-0.038
					(0.051)			(0.082)
Personal Authority	0.243				0.670 ***			0.241
	(0.246)				(0.172)			(0.247)
Investment Distance						-0.004 ***	-0.004 ***	-0.004 ***
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Foreign Investment Pct	-0.010 ***					-0.006 ***	-0.007 ***	-0.007 ***
	(0.001)					(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Domestic Institutions:								
Treaties Superior	0.759 ***	0.856 ***	0.910 ***	0.702 ***	0.839 ***	0.815 ***	0.760 ***	0.762 ***
	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.124)	(0.124)
ICCPR Ratification	0.009	-0.060	0.053	-0.136 *	-0.065	-0.106	0.002	0.009
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.064)
Degree of Executive Power	0.240 ***	0.215 ***	0.211 ***	0.261 ***	0.212 ***	0.221 ***	0.245 ***	0.240 ***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Right to Association	0.019	-0.013	0.157	-0.368 ***	-0.028	-0.165	-0.028	0.031
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.092)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.094)	(0.096)	(0.102)
Treaties x ICCPR	3.252 *	4.562 **	3.596 *	5.261 ***	4.672 **	4.206 **	3.352 *	3.323 *
	(1.508)	(1.517)	(1.510)	(1.516)	(1.516)	(1.516)	(1.507)	(1.509)
Domestic (lagged):								
Governance Restrictions	-0.691 ***	-0.692 ***	-0.702 ***	-0.676 ***	-0.691 ***	-0.691 ***	-0.690 ***	-0.690 ***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Formation Restrictions	-0.674 ***	-0.667 ***	-0.673 ***	-0.652 ***	-0.665 ***	-0.670 ***	-0.673 ***	-0.675 ***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Operational Restrictions	-0.443 ***	-0.442 ***	-0.460 ***	-0.424 ***	-0.442 ***	-0.427 ***	-0.440 ***	-0.443 ***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Resource Restrictions	-0.193 ***	-0.168 ***	-0.158 ***	-0.214 ***	-0.171 ***	-0.154 ***	-0.192 ***	-0.193 ***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Political Competition	-0.111 **	-0.182 ***	-0.051	-0.252 ***	-0.173 ***	-0.198 ***	-0.114 **	-0.116 **
	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Corruption	0.752 ***	1.716 ***	0.821 ***	2.256 ***	1.513 ***	2.010 ***	0.956 ***	0.781 ***
	(0.217)	(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.177)	(0.215)	(0.175)	(0.190)	(0.217)
Performance Legitimacy	0.686 ***	0.572 ***	0.680 ***	0.594 ***	0.580 ***	0.589 ***	0.695 ***	0.684 ***
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)
GDP/Capita (log, ppp, kd)	-1.808	-1.750	-1.753	-1.683	-1.750	-1.852	-1.907	-1.799
	(3.154)	(3.099)	(3.148)	(3.100)	(3.094)	(3.104)	(3.359)	(3.151)
International (lagged):								
Ideal Point (between)	-4.843 ***	-4.825 ***	-4.855 ***	-4.814 ***	-4.819 ***	-4.816 ***	-4.918 ***	-4.841 ***
	(0.604)	(0.597)	(0.601)	(0.596)	(0.597)	(0.598)	(0.657)	(0.603)
Ideal Point (within)	-1.173 ***	-1.064 ***	-1.111 ***	-1.126 ***	-1.055 ***	-1.074 ***	-1.183 ***	-1.176 ***
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Laggard UNSC	0.552 ***	0.524 ***	0.532 ***	0.536 ***	0.525 ***	0.523 ***	0.547 ***	0.548 ***
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Leader UNSC	-0.002	0.000	-0.001	0.001	0.000	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
NUMIGO (between)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
NUMIGO (within)	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Time Knot 1	0.395 ***	0.405 ***	0.405 ***	0.409 ***	0.404 ***	0.406 ***	0.398 ***	0.395 ***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Time Knot 2	-0.957 ***	-0.963 ***	-0.963 ***	-1.007 ***	-0.954 ***	-0.949 ***	-0.967 ***	-0.959 ***
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Time Knot 3	1.372 ***	1.374 ***	1.375 ***	1.452 ***	1.360 ***	1.347 ***	1.388 ***	1.375 ***
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.091)
Intercept	-8.680 ***	-8.762 ***	-8.791 ***	-8.686 ***	-8.755 ***	-8.789 ***	-8.732 ***	-8.671 ***
	(0.558)	(0.551)	(0.556)	(0.550)	(0.550)	(0.551)	(0.523)	(0.558)
DF Residual	128658	128662	128662	128661	128662	128662	128657	128653
AIC	112798	113403	113153	113225	113401	113284	112775	112779
BIC	113130	113696	113446	113528	113694	113577	113117	113160

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. SEs in parentheses. Number of directed dyads are 128,692 with 146 distinct states. Random effects include an intercept and a coefficient on GDP/Capita.

TABLE 7: Government Removes CSO Restrictions Poisson Regression, Full Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Distance (lagged):								
Judicial Distance		-0.037					-0.010	-0.025
		(0.034)					(0.034)	(0.052)
Judicial Constraint	2.249 ***	1.566 ***					2.016 ***	2.243 ***
	(0.140)	(0.109)					(0.119)	(0.141)
Bureaucratic Distance			0.003					0.011
			(0.007)					(0.008)
Impartial Bureaucracy	-0.242 ***		-0.018					-0.240 ***
	(0.027)		(0.024)					(0.027)
Nationalist Distance				-0.037 **			-0.037 **	-0.038 **
				(0.013)			(0.013)	(0.013)
Nationalism	1.207 ***			1.411 ***			1.161 ***	1.233 ***
	(0.085)			(0.083)			(0.083)	(0.085)
Ideological Strength	0.337 ***			0.189 ***			0.329 ***	0.339 ***
	(0.022)			(0.021)			(0.022)	(0.022)
Personalistic Distance					-0.017			-0.005
					(0.036)			(0.059)
Personal Authority	-0.312 *				-1.249 ***			-0.313 *
	(0.146)				(0.122)			(0.147)
Investment Distance						-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
						(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Foreign Investment Pct	0.007 ***					0.008 ***	0.007 ***	0.007 ***
	(0.001)					(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Domestic Institutions:								
Treaties Superior	-4.949 ***	-4.799 ***	-4.786 ***	-4.797 ***	-4.794 ***	-4.775 ***	-4.833 ***	-4.941 ***
	(0.184)	(0.183)	(0.184)	(0.183)	(0.184)	(0.184)	(0.183)	(0.183)
ICCPR Ratification	0.110 **	-0.033	0.060	0.127 ***	0.027	0.051	0.016	0.109 **
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.039)
Degree of Executive Power	-0.217 ***	-0.198 ***	-0.234 ***	-0.245 ***	-0.213 ***	-0.231 ***	-0.217 ***	-0.217 ***
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Right to Association	-0.801 ***	-0.841 ***	-0.185 **	-0.287 ***	-0.447 ***	-0.149 *	-0.849 ***	-0.790 ***
	(0.082)	(0.078)	(0.068)	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.065)	(0.081)	(0.082)
Treaties x ICCPR	-15.985	-19.474	-19.518	-16.032	-19.238	-18.691	-14.658	-15.930
	(53.134)	(51.474)	(52.580)	(54.352)	(52.306)	(50.848)	(51.927)	(53.162)
Domestic (lagged):								
Governance Restrictions	0.611 ***	0.597 ***	0.589 ***	0.602 ***	0.595 ***	0.599 ***	0.619 ***	0.611 ***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Formation Restrictions	0.706 ***	0.691 ***	0.656 ***	0.681 ***	0.673 ***	0.655 ***	0.712 ***	0.706 ***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Operational Restrictions	0.661 ***	0.657 ***	0.664 ***	0.663 ***	0.668 ***	0.663 ***	0.658 ***	0.661 ***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Resource Restrictions	0.349 ***	0.364 ***	0.369 ***	0.354 ***	0.366 ***	0.364 ***	0.349 ***	0.349 ***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Political Competition	0.119 ***	0.083 **	0.089 **	0.068 *	0.043	0.092 **	0.077 **	0.117 ***
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Corruption	-0.728 ***	-0.513 **	-1.610 ***	-1.872 ***	-0.669 ***	-1.563 ***	-0.562 ***	-0.715 ***
	(0.182)	(0.167)	(0.160)	(0.154)	(0.175)	(0.152)	(0.170)	(0.182)
Performance Legitimacy	0.773 ***	0.497 ***	0.508 ***	0.686 ***	0.529 ***	0.514 ***	0.720 ***	0.768 ***
	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.030)
GDP/Capita (log, ppp, kd)	1.763	1.984	1.879	1.779	1.811	1.780	1.755	1.751
	(3.138)	(3.079)	(3.134)	(3.199)	(3.222)	(3.115)	(3.120)	(3.138)
International (lagged):								
Ideal Point (between)	0.546	0.390	0.380	0.508	0.401	0.371	0.524	0.544
	(0.441)	(0.427)	(0.435)	(0.449)	(0.434)	(0.422)	(0.431)	(0.441)
Ideal Point (within)	0.597 ***	0.579 ***	0.581 ***	0.567 ***	0.568 ***	0.597 ***	0.590 ***	0.597 ***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Laggard UNSC	-0.029	-0.016	-0.016	-0.012	-0.017	-0.014	-0.011	-0.030
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Leader UNSC	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
NUMIGO (between)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
NUMIGO (within)	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Time Knot 1	-0.125 ***	-0.123 ***	-0.108 ***	-0.122 ***	-0.110 ***	-0.117 ***	-0.139 ***	-0.124 ***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Time Knot 2	0.241 ***	0.233 ***	0.195 ***	0.235 ***	0.178 ***	0.201 ***	0.275 ***	0.238 ***
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Time Knot 3	-0.335 ***	-0.314 ***	-0.262 ***	-0.330 ***	-0.228 **	-0.266 ***	-0.384 ***	-0.331 ***
	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Intercept	-0.038	-0.121	-0.215	-0.087	-0.163	-0.119	0.036	-0.046
	(0.351)	(0.342)	(0.349)	(0.357)	(0.349)	(0.343)	(0.345)	(0.352)
DF Residual	110451	110455	110455	110454	110455	110455	110450	110446
AIC	181182	181790	181997	181587	181891	181937	181259	181180
BIC	181509	182078	182286	181885	182180	182225	181595	181555

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. SEs in parentheses. Number of directed dyads are 110,485 with 111 distinct states. Random effects include an intercept and a coefficient on GDP/Capita.

Robustness Checks

Table 8 tests our empirical predictions across different response variables. The first three specifications are equivalent to Model 8 in in our 'adds' analysis (Table 6) and the remaining specifications are equivalent to Model 8 in our 'removes' analysis (Table 7). The V-Dem measure is a continuous variable analysed here with a multilevel OLS regression. The Glasius variable is a count variable analysed with a multilevel Poisson model. Glasius, Schalk, and De Lange (2020, p. 462) explain that a key feature of their *de jure* data is that once a restriction is adopted, it is hardly ever revoked. This makes the Glasius response variable unavailable to our 'removes' analysis.

TABLE 8: Comparison Against Different Response Variables

	Adds Restrictions			Removes Restrictions	
	Bakke	V-Dem	Glasius	Bakke	V-Dem
Judicial Distance	-0.012	0.056 **	-1.024	-0.025	-0.002
	(0.068)	(0.019)	(0.737)	(0.052)	(0.005)
Judicial Constraint	-0.084	0.092 **	0.347	2.243 ***	0.012
	(0.196)	(0.033)	(2.552)	(0.141)	(0.014)
Bureaucratic Distance	-0.011	-0.001	-0.073	0.011	-0.000
	(0.012)	(0.003)	(0.124)	(0.008)	(0.001)
Impartial Bureaucracy	-0.516 ***	-0.041 ***	-1.411 **	-0.240 ***	-0.005 *
	(0.032)	(0.005)	(0.444)	(0.027)	(0.002)
Nationalist Distance	-0.058 **	-0.035 ***	0.043	-0.038 **	0.002
	(0.018)	(0.004)	(0.215)	(0.013)	(0.001)
Nationalism	1.410 ***	0.129 ***	-0.235	1.233 ***	0.096 ***
	(0.112)	(0.014)	(1.617)	(0.085)	(0.007)
Ideological Strength	-0.239 ***	0.028 ***	1.978 ***	0.339 ***	0.012 ***
	(0.025)	(0.004)	(0.434)	(0.022)	(0.002)
Personalistic Distance	-0.038	-0.044 *	0.702	-0.005	0.005
	(0.082)	(0.022)	(0.939)	(0.059)	(0.006)
Personal Authority	0.241	-0.841 ***	-1.762	-0.313 *	0.120 ***
	(0.247)	(0.040)	(3.162)	(0.147)	(0.018)
Investment Distance	-0.004 ***	-0.000	-0.006	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.010)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Foreign Investment Pct	-0.007 ***	0.002 ***	0.008	0.007 ***	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.015)	(0.001)	(0.000)
N(States)	146	146	81	111	146
N(Directed Dyads)	128692	37748	4767	110485	31588
DF Residual	128653	37710	4730	110446	31550

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. SEs in parentheses. All models include the same Domestic Institutions, Lagged Domestic Control, and Random Effects variables.

Table 9 shows the degree to which our results vary when using different techniques to account for clustering within the data. Recall that fewer than 200 countries produce country-level variables, while more than 30,000 unique directed-dyads produce the distance variables used to test our empirical predictions. Comparing results across models shows that point estimates and standard errors vary by technique. The starkly lower AIC and BIC values indicate the multilevel model fits the data better than the alternative techniques. The multilevel model also appears more conservative because it produces generally smaller effect sizes and fewer statistically significant results:

- 5 of 5 distance variables are significant in the fixed effects model.
- 5 of 5 distance variables are significant robust standard errors model.
- 2 of 5 distance variables are significant in the robust clustered standard errors model.
- 2 of 5 distance variables are significant in the mixed effects model.

TABLE 9: GLM Specification Comparisons on Adds CSO Restrictions

	FE	Robust	RCSE	Mixed
Distance (lagged):				
Judicial Distance	0.454 ***	0.454 ***	0.454 *	-0.011
	(0.070)	(0.085)	(0.201)	(0.068)
Judicial Constraint	-0.554 ***	-0.554 **	-0.554	-0.085
	(0.153)	(0.209)	(2.245)	(0.196)
Bureaucratic Distance	-0.078 ***	-0.078 ***	-0.078	-0.012
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.050)	(0.012)
Impartial Bureaucracy	-0.391 ***	-0.391 ***	-0.391	-0.516 ***
	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.341)	(0.032)
Nationalist Distance	-0.096 ***	-0.096 ***	-0.096	-0.058 **
	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.120)	(0.018)
Nationalism	0.756 ***	0.756 ***	0.756	1.413 ***
	(0.067)	(0.089)	(0.826)	(0.112)
Ideological Strength	-0.078 ***	-0.078 **	-0.078	-0.239 ***
	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.262)	(0.025)
Personalistic Distance	-0.590 ***	-0.590 ***	-0.590 *	-0.039
	(0.083)	(0.102)	(0.261)	(0.082)
Personal Authority	-0.633 **	-0.633 *	-0.633	0.242
	(0.207)	(0.294)	(3.126)	(0.247)
Investment Distance	-0.004 ***	-0.004 ***	-0.004	-0.004 ***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Foreign Investment Pct	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.007 ***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Domestic Institutions:				
Treaties Superior	-0.242 ***	-0.242 ***	-0.242	0.761 ***
	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.729)	(0.124)
ICCPR Ratification	0.282 ***	0.282 ***	0.282	0.010
	(0.037)	(0.049)	(0.440)	(0.064)
Degree of Executive Power	0.276 ***	0.276 ***	0.276	0.240 ***
	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.171)	(0.018)
Right to Association	-0.937 ***	-0.937 ***	-0.937	0.030
	(0.069)	(0.080)	(0.820)	(0.102)
Treaties x ICCPR	1.254	1.254	1.254	3.323 *
	(1.171)	(1.094)	(7.737)	(1.507)
Domestic (lagged):				
Governance Restrictions	-0.844 ***	-0.844 ***	-0.844 ***	-0.690 ***
	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.197)	(0.017)
Formation Restrictions	-0.803 ***	-0.803 ***	-0.803 ***	-0.675 ***
	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.226)	(0.019)
Operational Restrictions	-0.585 ***	-0.585 ***	-0.585 ***	-0.443 ***
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.148)	(0.014)
Resource Restrictions	-0.120 ***	-0.120 **	-0.120	-0.193 ***
	(0.026)	(0.041)	(0.325)	(0.026)
Political Competition	0.068 *	0.068	0.068	-0.115 **
	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.463)	(0.042)
Corruption	1.164 ***	1.164 ***	1.164	0.776 ***
	(0.140)	(0.172)	(2.021)	(0.217)
Performance Legitimacy	0.296 ***	0.296 ***	0.296	0.684 ***
	(0.021)	(0.034)	(0.426)	(0.033)
GDP/Capita (log, ppp, kd)	0.479 ***	0.479 ***	0.479	-2.633
	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.635)	(3.347)
DF Residual	128659	128659	128659	128655
AIC	158305	158305	158305	112828
BIC	158627	158627	158627	113189

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. SEs in parentheses.

Descriptive Statistics

TABLE 10: Table of Descriptive Statistics for Government Restriction Addition–Actual and Demeaned

	Untransformed Data						DeMeaned Data					
Variable Name	**N**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Median**	**Min**	**Max**	**N**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Median**	**Min**	**Max**
Distance Variables												
Contiguous Type[a]	128692	0.033	0.179	0	0	1	128692	0	0.061	0	-0.88	0.8
Foreign Investment	128692	6.809	22.108	2.809	0	452.801	128692	0.639	18.724	-0.627	-124.949	411.108
Nationalist Ideology	128692	0.819	0.68	0.656	0	5.013	128692	0.009	0.325	0.001	-1.98	2.849
Impartial Bureaucracy	128692	1.648	1.227	1.381	0	6.719	128692	0.007	0.589	-0.003	-3.088	3.878
Judicial Constraint	128692	0.383	0.259	0.346	0	0.975	128692	0.008	0.126	0.004	-0.656	0.677
Net Exports[a]	115720	16.307	15.963	12.046	0	204.602	115720	0.128	11.644	-0.65	-91.223	178.764
Personalistic Legitimacy	128692	0.376	0.256	0.336	0	0.966	128692	0.007	0.117	0.005	-0.595	0.628
Number of Mutual IGOs	128692	33.615	9.501	32	10	100	128692	1.206	4.917	1.4	-37.86	45.232
Laggard Country Variables												
Right to Associate	125359	0.915	0.279	1	0	1	128692	0.011	0.086	0	-0.941	0.817
Corruption	128692	0.487	0.314	0.559	0.005	0.971	128692	0.003	0.049	0	-0.335	0.341
Government Restrictions Count	128692	0.226	0.504	0	0	2	128692	-0.083	0.345	0	-1.802	1.75
Formation Restrictions Count	128692	0.171	0.459	0	0	2	128692	-0.037	0.274	0	-1.603	1.699
Operations Restrictions Count	128692	0.19	0.514	0	0	4	128692	-0.085	0.395	-0.05	-2.202	3.398
Resource Restrictions Count	128692	0.044	0.223	0	0	2	128692	-0.024	0.189	0	-1.302	1.702
CSO Consultation[a]	128692	0.978	1.222	1.05	-2.444	3.386	128692	0.07	0.418	0.021	-2.56	1.87
Degree of Executive Power	125359	5.938	2.214	6	0	10	128692	0.033	0.51	0	-3.764	4.241
Foreign Investment	128692	6.05	22.101	2.681	-58.323	449.083	128692	0.937	18.475	-0.14	-83.795	377.571
UN Ideal Point	128692	0.028	0.856	-0.234	-1.903	3.148	128692	-0.01	0.204	-0.019	-1.129	1.184
Ideological Strength	128692	-0.554	1.209	-0.823	-2.789	2.952	128692	-0.017	0.311	0	-1.268	1.882
Impartial Bureaucracy	128692	0.63	1.398	0.44	-3.019	3.607	128692	0.061	0.316	0.027	-2.021	2.059
Judicial Constraint	128692	0.645	0.277	0.723	0.027	0.985	128692	0.01	0.064	0.001	-0.458	0.384
Log GDP/Capita KD	128692	9.149	1.221	9.232	6.151	11.655	128692	0.028	0.188	0.022	-1.339	1.331
Nationalism	128692	0.526	0.292	0.5	0	1	128692	0.003	0.088	0	-0.525	0.477
Net Exports per cent GDP[a]	123071	-4.534	15.285	-3.861	-161.428	49.761	123071	0.337	7.806	0.334	-87.518	37.164
Government Performance Legitimacy	128692	0.77	0.935	0.902	-2.294	2.528	128692	0.031	0.265	0	-1.25	1.504
Personal Authority	128692	0.408	0.293	0.416	0.008	0.965	128692	-0.009	0.057	-0.003	-0.388	0.359
Political Competition	128692	0.89	0.298	1	0	1	128692	0.019	0.162	0	-0.96	0.798
Ratified ICCPR	128692	0.888	0.316	1	0	1	128692	0.034	0.147	0	-0.754	0.79
Treaties Superior	125359	0.325	0.469	0	0	1	128692	0.006	0.113	0	-0.818	0.832
UNSC Member	128692	1.092	0.289	1	1	2	128692	0.003	0.232	-0.039	-0.32	0.921
Leader Country Variables												
Right to Associate	104006	0.928	0.258	1	0	1	104778	0.007	0.113	0	-0.941	0.817
Corruption	128402	0.678	0.235	0.76	0.01	0.971	128402	0.01	0.064	0.008	-0.449	0.357
Government Restrictions Count	128593	0.905	0.735	1	0	2	128593	0.149	0.563	0.048	-1.802	1.901
Formation Restrictions Count	128692	0.685	0.764	1	0	2	128692	0.074	0.486	0	-1.603	1.9
Operations Restrictions Count	128594	0.913	0.952	1	0	4	128594	0.123	0.726	-0.05	-2.202	3.398
Resource Restrictions Count	128692	0.263	0.543	0	0	2	128692	0.036	0.432	0	-1.302	1.801
CSO Consultation[a]	128692	0.014	1.17	-0.012	-2.444	3.154	128692	0.035	0.518	0.005	-2.56	2.214
Degree of Executive Power	104006	6.437	2.241	7	0	10	104778	0.056	0.621	0	-3.764	4.241
Foreign Investment	128692	3.965	6.758	2.281	-10.257	103.337	128692	0.247	5.481	-0.172	-41.489	71.974
UN Ideal Point	127367	-0.503	0.684	-0.597	-2.066	2.465	127367	-0.02	0.258	-0.013	-1.34	0.867
Ideological Strength	128692	0.146	1.161	0.114	-2.72	2.952	128692	-0.006	0.326	-0.006	-1.821	1.925
Impartial Bureaucracy	128692	-0.447	1.074	-0.62	-3.112	3.215	128692	-0.005	0.388	0	-1.773	1.755
Judicial Constraint	128692	0.398	0.282	0.355	0.01	0.979	128692	-0.006	0.09	-0.002	-0.458	0.504
Log GDP/Capita KD	120634	8.707	1.152	8.691	6.376	11.563	120634	0.02	0.251	-0.002	-1.937	1.331
Nationalism	128692	0.562	0.28	0.5	0	1	128692	0.004	0.081	0	-0.525	0.475
Net Exports per cent GDP[a]	121028	-3.449	16.787	-3.733	-112.246	49.761	121028	0.627	9.612	0.494	-87.431	85.488
Government Performance Legitimacy	128692	0.546	0.978	0.622	-2.294	2.511	128692	0.046	0.297	0.028	-1.25	1.504
Personal Authority	128692	0.657	0.248	0.718	0.016	0.974	128692	0.006	0.081	0.003	-0.345	0.375
Political Competition	128692	0.763	0.406	1	0	1	128692	0.01	0.206	0	-0.96	0.838
Ratified ICCPR	126951	0.801	0.4	1	0	1	126951	0.04	0.204	0	-0.795	0.79
Treaties Superior	104006	0.3	0.458	0	0	1	104778	0.003	0.074	0	-0.818	0.832
UNSC Member	128692	1.082	0.274	1	1	2	128692	-0.004	0.217	-0.039	-0.321	0.921
Other												
Year Knot 1	128692	13.498	5.171	14	4	22	128692	13.498	5.171	14	4	22
Year Knot 2	128692	6.03	5.6	4.539	0.056	18.552	128692	6.03	5.6	4.539	0.056	18.552
Year Knot 3	128692	2.05	2.435	1.058	0	8.013	128692	2.05	2.435	1.058	0	8.013

[a] Presented for illustrative purposes only. Not used in analyses due to correlation with other variables or missing data.

TABLE 11: Table of Descriptive Statistics for Government Restriction Removal–Actual and Demeaned

	Untransformed Data						DeMeaned Data					
Variable Name	**N**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Median**	**Min**	**Max**	**N**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Median**	**Min**	**Max**
Distance Variables												
Contiguous Type[a]	110485	0.034	0.181	0	0	1	110485	0	0.059	0	-0.88	0.8
Foreign Investment	110485	6.372	19.365	2.755	0	452.801	110485	0.66	16.356	-0.591	-124.949	380.578
Nationalist Ideology	110485	0.796	0.651	0.647	0	5.013	110485	0.008	0.332	0	-1.996	2.849
Impartial Bureaucracy	110485	1.582	1.195	1.309	0	6.378	110485	-0.008	0.575	-0.005	-3.088	3.878
Judicial Constraint	110485	0.359	0.248	0.318	0	0.958	110485	0.002	0.123	0.001	-0.688	0.677
Net Exports[a]	99930	16.708	16.002	12.389	0	204.602	99930	0.255	11.518	-0.656	-103.392	178.764
Personalistic Legitimacy	110485	0.354	0.246	0.314	0	0.957	110485	0.003	0.116	0.002	-0.623	0.647
Number of Mutual IGOs	110485	33.902	9.382	32	10	100	110485	1.154	4.925	1.34	-37.86	45.232
Laggard Country Variables												
Right to Associate	106907	0.931	0.253	1	0	1	110485	0.008	0.108	0	-0.875	0.817
Corruption	110485	0.667	0.241	0.751	0.01	0.971	110485	0.007	0.054	0.006	-0.181	0.341
Government Restrictions Count	110485	0.931	0.745	1	0	2	110485	0.207	0.552	0.05	-1.601	1.901
Formation Restrictions Count	110485	0.669	0.761	0	0	2	110485	0.105	0.484	0	-1.603	1.9
Operations Restrictions Count	110485	0.907	0.94	1	0	4	110485	0.196	0.687	0	-2.202	3.398
Resource Restrictions Count	110485	0.248	0.521	0	0	2	110485	0.048	0.409	0	-1.302	1.801
CSO Consultation[a]	110485	0.09	1.093	0.037	-2.226	3.154	110485	0.071	0.506	0.014	-2.56	2.214
Degree of Executive Power	106907	6.395	2.245	7	0	10	110485	0.034	0.603	0	-3.229	4.241
Foreign Investment	110485	4.129	7.578	2.275	-10.257	103.337	110485	0.467	5.92	-0.097	-41.489	71.974
UN Ideal Point	110485	-0.477	0.603	-0.55	-2.029	1.45	110485	-0.004	0.237	0	-1.34	0.867
Ideological Strength	110485	0.085	1.145	0.085	-2.72	2.952	110485	-0.022	0.321	-0.006	-1.809	1.925
Impartial Bureaucracy	110485	-0.336	1.041	-0.518	-2.771	3.215	110485	0.022	0.347	0.004	-1.773	1.425
Judicial Constraint	110485	0.434	0.271	0.424	0.028	0.979	110485	0.003	0.083	0	-0.458	0.504
Log GDP/Capita KD	110485	8.71	1.178	8.705	6.376	11.563	110485	0.023	0.249	-0.005	-1.812	1.298
Nationalism	110485	0.544	0.288	0.5	0	1	110485	0.003	0.084	0	-0.525	0.475
Net Exports per cent GDP[a]	105878	-3.648	16.82	-4.604	-112.246	48.452	105878	0.525	8.892	0.24	-87.431	37.164
Government Performance Legitimacy	110485	0.535	1.014	0.622	-2.294	2.511	110485	0.037	0.297	0.007	-1.25	1.504
Personal Authority	110485	0.631	0.237	0.675	0.016	0.965	110485	-0.002	0.074	0.002	-0.345	0.36
Political Competition	110485	0.776	0.395	1	0	1	110485	0.025	0.205	0	-0.96	0.798
Ratified ICCPR	110485	0.793	0.405	1	0	1	110485	0.032	0.188	0	-0.712	0.79
Treaties Superior	106907	0.31	0.462	0	0	1	110485	0.001	0.072	0	-0.818	0.832
UNSC Member	110485	1.088	0.284	1	1	2	110485	-0.005	0.211	-0.039	-0.32	0.921
Leader Country Variables												
Right to Associate	85239	0.918	0.274	1	0	1	85921	0.01	0.09	0	-0.941	0.817
Corruption	110368	0.499	0.314	0.576	0.005	0.971	110368	0.004	0.057	0	-0.552	0.357
Government Restrictions Count	110471	0.294	0.567	0	0	2	110471	-0.042	0.408	0	-1.802	1.901
Formation Restrictions Count	110485	0.212	0.51	0	0	2	110485	-0.02	0.301	0	-1.603	1.9
Operations Restrictions Count	110468	0.267	0.608	0	0	4	110468	-0.048	0.462	0	-2.202	3.398
Resource Restrictions Count	110485	0.066	0.282	0	0	2	110485	-0.014	0.237	0	-1.302	1.801
CSO Consultation	110485	0.941	1.249	1.067	-2.444	3.386	110485	0.074	0.44	0.016	-2.56	3.129
Degree of Executive Power	85239	5.988	2.211	6	0	10	85921	0.035	0.536	0	-3.764	4.241
Foreign Investment	110485	5.471	18.95	2.666	-58.323	449.083	110485	0.808	15.85	-0.156	-83.795	377.571
UN Ideal Point	109079	0	0.875	-0.271	-2.066	3.148	109079	-0.01	0.217	-0.015	-1.34	1.184
Ideological Strength	110485	-0.524	1.246	-0.818	-2.789	2.952	110485	-0.02	0.319	0	-2.383	1.925
Impartial Bureaucracy	110485	0.556	1.45	0.292	-3.112	3.607	110485	0.042	0.337	0.02	-2.021	2.059
Judicial Constraint	110485	0.626	0.29	0.715	0.01	0.986	110485	0.007	0.071	0.002	-0.458	0.544
Log GDP/Capita KD	107507	9.137	1.238	9.232	6.151	11.655	107507	0.022	0.194	0.015	-1.937	1.331
Nationalism	110485	0.52	0.28	0.5	0	1	110485	0.001	0.09	0	-0.525	0.477
Net Exports per cent GDP[a]	104296	-4.366	15.737	-3.351	-161.428	49.761	104296	0.363	8.081	0.356	-87.518	85.488
Government Performance Legitimacy	110485	0.725	0.928	0.845	-2.294	2.528	110485	0.035	0.271	0	-1.753	1.504
Personal Authority	110485	0.428	0.303	0.435	0.008	0.974	110485	-0.006	0.065	-0.002	-0.634	0.375
Political Competition	110485	0.877	0.314	1	0	1	110485	0.013	0.167	0	-0.96	0.879
Ratified ICCPR	110090	0.874	0.331	1	0	1	110090	0.033	0.167	0	-0.795	0.79
Treaties Superior	85239	0.322	0.467	0	0	1	85921	0.004	0.109	0	-0.818	0.832
UNSC Member	110485	1.093	0.29	1	1	2	110485	0.001	0.235	-0.04	-0.321	0.921
Other												
Year Knot 1	110485	13.492	5.232	14	4	22	110485	13.492	5.232	14	4	22
Year Knot 2	110485	6.068	5.644	4.539	0.056	18.552	110485	6.068	5.644	4.539	0.056	18.552
Year Knot 3	110485	2.072	2.451	1.058	0	8.013	110485	2.072	2.451	1.058	0	8.013

[a] Presented for illustrative purposes only. Not used in analyses due to correlation with other variables or missing data.